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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Derek Moad appeals from the judgment of conviction entered after a jury found 
him guilty of male rape, battery with intent to commit rape or the infamous crime against 
nature, and misdemeanor battery. He contends that the State improperly punished him 
for multiple offenses arising out of the same, indivisible course of criminal conduct (male 
rape and battery with intent to commit a serious felony) in violation of the state and 
federal protection against double jeopardy. He also contends that, if the charges were 
appropriate, the State presented insufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict for 
battery with intent to commit rape or the infamous crime against nature. As such, this 
Court should either vacate the convictions on the duplicitous charges, or at least, it 
should vacate the insufficiently-supported conviction, and it should remand this case for 
further proceedings. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Moad was incarcerated at the Idaho Correctional Center and was sharing a 
cell with "LT." (See Tr., Vo1.2, p.119, Ls.21-22.)1 L.T. reported that Mr. Moad had 
assaulted him, choking and beating him before forcing him to perform oral sex on 
Mr. Moad. (Tr., Vo1.2, p.156, Ls.11-22.) Mr. Moad admitted to that conduct. (State's 
Exhibit 2 (Mr. Moad's written statement); State's Exhibit 4 (audio recording of Detetctive 
Matthew Buie's interview with Mr. Moad).) 
1 The transcripts in this case are contained in two independently bound and paginated 
volumes. To promote clarity, "Vol. 1 " will refer to the volume containing the transcript of 
the pretrial conference held on May 7, 2012. "VoI.2" will refer to the volume containing 
the transcripts from the jury trial held on May 29 and May 30,2012. 
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According to L.T., "at that same altercation, it was finally him getting me to go 
over to my bunk and him pulling down my pants down to where -- rubbing his privates 
up against my buttocks." (Tr., Vo1.2, p.158, LsA-8.) Mr. Moad did not ejaculate during 
this incident. (Tr., Vo1.2, p.160, Ls.10-11.) In fact, according to L.T., all the acts 
underlying Counts I and II occurred "in the same period of time." (Tr., Vo1.2, p.157, L.22 
- p.158, L.2.) L.T. testified that conduct eventually ended because Mr. Moad "just finally 
quit ... he sat down on one of the benches there that was on -- by that table there," and 
began to clean himself off. (Tr., Vo1.2, p.160, Ls.6-21.) According to L.T., whenever he 
and Mr. Moad got into a physical altercation, Mr. Moad would come out on top, do what 
he wanted, and then simply stop.2 (Tr., Vo1.2, p.155, Ls.7-16.) The State charged 
Mr. Moad via indictment with male rape and battery with intent to commit rape or the 
infamous crime against nature as a result of this incident. (R., pp.7-8, 12-13.) The jury 
convicted Mr. Moad as charged on those counts. (R., pp.123-24.) 
L.T., a few days later, another incident occurred, where Mr. Moad pinned him 
down on one of the bunks and began hitting him with fists and his penis. (Tr., Vo1.2, 
p.163, Ls.8-22.) Mr. Moad admitted to that conduct as well. (State's Exhibit 2 
(Mr. Moad's written statement); State's Exhibit 4 (audio recording of Detetctive Matthew 
Buie's interview with Mr. Moad).) The State charged Mr. Moad with battery with intent 
to commit rape or the infamous crime against nature for this incident as well. (R., pp.7-
8, 12-13.) The jury acquitted Mr. Moad of this offense, convicting him only of the lesser 
included offense of misdemeanor battery. (R., pp.125-26.) 
The jury also convicted Mr. Moad as charged on Counts I and II. (R., pp.123-26.) 
The district court imposed a unified sentence of life, with ten years fixed, for the male 
2 L.T. did not indicate that any of these other events were sexual in nature, only that the 
2 
rape conviction, a concurrent ten-year fixed sentence, with zero years indeterminate, 
for the felony battery, and a concurrent six-month sentence for the misdemeanor 
battery. (R., p.137.) Mr. Moad timely appealed from the judgment of conviction. 
(R., pp.136-42.) 
confrontations became physical. (See generally Tr., Vo1.2, p.145, L.8 - p.178, L.12.) 
3 
ISSUES 
1. Whether the punishment for both Counts I and II violated Mr. Moad's 
constitutional right to be free double jeopardy. 
2. Whether there was insufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict against 





The Punishments For Both Counts I And II Violated Mr. Moad's Constitutional Right To 
Be Free From Double Jeopardy 
A. Introduction 
The protections against double jeopardy in the United States and Idaho 
Constitutions extend to prevent multiple punishments for the same criminal conduct. 
Those protections cannot be circumvented simply by breaking a single course of 
criminal conduct into multiple acts so as to charge multiple crimes. The law is clear: 
unless the actions are occurring in different places, at different times, or to different 
people, the course of conduct is indivisible and pursuing punishments for multiple 
acts occurring during an indivisible course of conduct is prohibited by the state and 
federal constitutions. Since Counts I and II do precisely that, those convictions should 
be vacated. 
B. Double Jeopardy Violations Are Reviewable As Fundamental Error 
Normally, the appellate courts will not consider issues not raised below unless 
they constitute fundamental error. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224-25 (2010). 
To demonstrate fundamental error, the appellant must show that the error violated one 
or more of his constitutional rights, is clear and obvious from the record, and prejudiced 
him. Id. at 226. 
Mr. Moad did not waive his constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy. 
(See generally R.) As such, a violation of that right would fulfill the first prong of the 
Perry analysis. The violation of Mr. Moad's constitutional rights, as will be discussed in 
detail in Section I(C), infra, is clear and obvious from the record. The prejudice caused 
5 
is evident by the fact that separate convictions with separate sentences were entered 
on both Count I and Count II. Therefore, since all three prongs of the Peny analysis are 
met, this Court should address the violation of Mr. Moad's constitutional right to be free 
from double jeopardy. 
C. Because Counts I And II Charge Different Acts Within An Indivisible Course Of 
Conduct, The Convictions Violate Mr. Moad's Constitutional Rights 
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth Amendment's Double 
Jeopardy Clause to mean that "two valid sentences for the same conviction cannot 
coexist." Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 267 (1943). Article I, Section 13 of 
the Idaho Constitution is coextensive with the federal provision. State v. McKeeth, 136 
Idaho 619, 624 (Ct. App. 2001). These protections can be violated in three ways: 
(1) engaging in a second prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal has been 
entered; (2) engaging in a second prosecution for the same offense after a conviction 
has been entered; or (3) imposing multiple punishments for the same offense. United 
States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980); McKeeth, 136 Idaho at 622. This 
case involves multiple charges resulting in multiple punishments for the same offense, 
and so, falls into the third category of double jeopardy violations. See id. 
Mr. Moad asserts that all the actions which occurred on the first day (the 
punching and strangling preceding the oral rape, the oral rape, and the buttocks 
incident) constitute one, indivisible course of conduct, since they were not spatially or 
temporally separated and in response to a single criminal impulse. As such, he 
contends that those actions cannot be artificially separated into multiple counts, as the 
State did in this case, without violating his constitutional rights to be free from double 
jeopardy. 
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However, if this Court allows that artificial division of his actions, there are two 
potential ways in which the acts alleged in Count II may be viewed: they may refer to 
either Mr. Moad's actions preceding the oral rape (the punching and strangling), or to 
his actions after he completed the oral rape (the buttocks incident). If the allegations 
are taken to refer to the actions before the oral rape, then Mr. Moad has been punished 
for both a greater and lesser included offense, and therefore, the convictions need to be 
vacated because they violate the constitutional protections against double jeopardy. 
Although the allegations could have been taken, as both attorneys argued to 
the jury, to refer to only to the actions after Mr. Moad finished with the oral rape, the 
conviction on Count II still needs to be vacated because the district court did not give 
any such limiting instruction to the jury. As a result, it is not clear whether the jury 
convicted Mr. Moad for only the acts following the oral rape (a proper basis), or whether 
it considered and convicted Mr. Moad for the acts occurring before the oral rape 
(an improper basis). In any case, the convictions on both Count I and Count II are 
erroneous and this Court should remedy that error. 
1. Mr. Moad's Actions In Regard To Counts I And II Constitute A Single, 
Indivisible Course Of Criminal Conduct 
The determination of whether a course of conduct constitutes a single offense for 
purposes of double jeopardy "depends on 'whether or not the conduct constituted 
separate, distinct and independent crimes' and 'requires an inquiry into the 
circumstances of the conduct and consideration of the 'intent and objective of the 
actor."" Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 267 (Ct. App. 2000) (quoting State v. Bush, 131 
Idaho 22,33-34 (1997) (quoting State v. Major, 111 Idaho 410,414 (1986)). The critical 
fact, which Idaho's courts have consistently looked to when resolving this issue, is 
7 
whether the acts are occurring at the same time, or at different times. See, e.g., Bush, 
131 Idaho at 34; State v. Grinolds, 121 Idaho 673,675 (1991); State v. Estes, 111 Idaho 
423,427 (1986)3; Major, 111 Idaho at 414; State v. Ormesher, 154 Idaho 221, 225 
(Ct. App. 2012); State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 41, 48 (Ct. App. 2003). 
For example, multiple prosecutions were permissible in a sexual assault case 
where "[t]he first sexual assault took place on J.S.'s bed. The second assault took 
place on J.S.'s couch .... [O]ther events occurred in between these acts of sexual 
assault." Bush, 131 Idaho at 34 (emphasis added). In fact, the Bush Court specifically 
distinguished the facts in that case from those in others based on the temporal and 
spatial separation of the acts: "[Estes] is further distinguishable because the present 
case did involve separate acts in different places." Id. Similarly, in a later case, multiple 
prosecutions were found to be permissible, even though the charged acts occurred on 
the same day and were perpetrated against the same victim at the same location, 
because the defendant "had intercourse with the girl in the bedroom, then left the 
bedroom and went to the living room for an unspecified period of time, and then 
returned and again engaged in sexual intercourse with the girl." Grinolds, 121 Idaho at 
675 (emphasis added). Thus, the critical factor is whether the acts were separated, 
either temporally or spatially. See, e.g., Bush, 131 Idaho at 34; Grinolds, 121 Idaho at 
675. 
Comparatively, in a rape case, even when the defendant penetrated the victim 
multiple times, that constituted only a single criminal act because "the separate 
3 The Court in Estes was specifically considering this issue in terms of joinder 
(i.e., whether several charges had been properly joined under I.C.R. 8). Estes, 111 
Idaho at 427. However, the reasoning from that decision has subsequently been 
discussed and applied in terms of double jeopardy. See, e.g., Bush, 131 Idaho at 34; 
Grin olds , 121 Idaho at 675. 
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penetrations were not separate acts at different times, in different places, with different 
actors or circumstances." Estes, 111 Idaho at 427. Similarly, multiple prosecutions 
were improper in a theft case where: 
"[t]he property was stolen at the same time from one individual. On the 
same day, [the defendant] and her associates transported all the stolen 
property to Lewiston, pawned one item there, and proceeded to the 
reservation where they were arrested. She possessed the various items, 
including the pawned item, as part of a 'single incident' and 'pursuant to a 
common scheme or plan reflecting a single, continuing [criminal] impulse 
or intent. 
Major, 111 Idaho at 114 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). In fact, the Court 
of Appeals recently noted "[i]t is unlikely [the defendant] could be tried for separate 
counts of sexual abuse of a child under sixteen for separate acts (kissing and touching 
her legs and/or breasts) given that those acts occurred as part of a single course of 
conduct, all while the two were in [the defendant's] vehicle." Ormesher, 154 Idaho at 
225. Thus, the clear rule of law is "although a series of sexual contacts which occur as 
part of a single incident constitute only one count . . . a number of sexual contacts 
occurring on separate occasions constitute multiple offenses." Jones, 140 Idaho at 48 
(emphasis added). 
As the rule is clear, so also is the violation of that rule in this case. L.T., the 
alleged victim in this case, testified that all the physical altercations which gave rise to 
Counts I and II occurred "in the same period of time," and as part of "that same 
altercation." (Tr., Vo1.2, p.157, L.22 - p.158, L.8.) Mr. Moad's version of events is 
consistent in that regard. (See State's Exhibits 2 and 4; Tr., Vo1.2, p.123, L.11 - p.124, 
L.18.) As such, there was no temporal separation between the two charged acts. 
There was also no spatial separation, as all the acts occurred in the pair's prison cell, 
which the evidence demonstrates, was not terribly spacious. (See State's Exhibits 
9 
1a-1f; Tr., Vo1.2, p.107, L.20 - p.112, L.9 (Officer Jenny Cheney describing the cells with 
the aid of Exhibits 1a-1f).) 
Furthermore, the evidence is clear that Mr. Moad was acting in response to a 
single scheme or plan reflecting a single, continuing criminal impulse or intent. 
L.T. testified that whenever he and Mr. Moad got into a physical confrontation, Mr. Moad 
was able to overpower him, and then Mr. Moad would do whatever it was he was 
intending to do, and then would simply stop. (See Tr., Vo1.2, p.155, Ls.7-16.) In regard 
to this specific incident, L.T. testified that Mr. Moad "just finally quit ... he sat down on 
one of the benches there that was on -- by that table there," and began to clean himself 
off. (Tr., Vo1.2, p.160, Ls.6-21.) According to the Officer Juan Ibarra, who interviewed 
Mr. Moad, Mr. Moad's intent behind the assault was to teach L.T. a lesson because 
L.T. had disrespected him. (Tr., Vo1.2, p.123, Ls.9-10.) In the recorded interview, 
Mr. Moad told Officer Buie he did what he did because he became frustrated with 
L.T. and could not restrain himself anymore. (State's Exhibit 4.) All the evidence 
indicates is that Mr. Moad thoroughly dominated L.T. via a single, continuous assault, 
and, having asserted his dominance, went about his normal business. As such, the 
events on the first day, not separated temporally or spatially, and all in response 
to a single, continuing criminal impulse, constituted an indivisible course of conduct. 
Compare, Estes, 111 Idaho at 427; Major, 111 Idaho at 114; Ormesher, 154 Idaho at 
225; contrast Bush, 131 Idaho at 34; Grin o Ids , 121 Idaho at 675; Jones, 140 Idaho at 
48. 
Therefore, Mr. Moad's state and federal constitutional rights to be free from 
double jeopardy were violated by the multiple charges for the same, indivisible course of 
criminal conduct, which resulted in multiple punishments for the same offense. 
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Mr. Moad committed a single physical assault on L.T. driven by a single impulse. There 
was no separation, spatially, temporally, or otherwise, of Mr. Moad's actions during that 
encounter. Both the United States and Idaho Constitutions protect against such 
prosecutions for multiple charges arising from such a single event. See Roberts, 320 
U.S. at 267; McKeeth, 136 Idaho at 624. Those protections "[are] not such a fragile 
guarantee that prosecutors can avoid [their] limitations by the simple expedient of 
dividing a single crime into a series of temporal or spatial units." Brown v. Ohio, 432 
U.S. 161,169 (1977). That is exactly what the State did in this case, and therefore, the 
convictions on the duplicitous charges should be vacated and this case remanded for 
further proceedings. 
2. If The Allegation In Count" Refers To The Actions Preceding The Oral 
Rape, Mr. Moad's Constitutional Rights To Be Free From Double 
Jeopardy Were Violated By The Multiple Punishments Imposed In Regard 
To Counts I And" 
In Idaho, there are two different lines of analysis to determine whether a person's 
right to be free from double jeopardy has been violated, one for the United States 
Constitution and the other for the Idaho Constitution. See, e.g., State v. McKinney, 153 
Idaho 837, 841 (2013); State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 527, 530-31 
(2011); State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 374 (Ct. App. 2011). Under the federal 
constitution, that question is analyzed under the Blockburger or "elements" test. 
See, e.g., Flegel, 151 Idaho at 527 (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 
(1932)). The Blockburger test assesses the elements of the statutes under which the 
defendant has been charged, looking for bilateral uniqueness, in that "each provision 
requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304; see 
also State v. Moffat, _ P.3d _,2013 Opinion No.2, pp.2-5 (Ct. App. Jan. 15,2013), 
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petition for rev. denied May 3, 2013. If no such bilateral uniqueness exists, multiple 
prosecutions under those statutes violate the federal constitution. Id. 
The two statutes at issue in this case are I.C. § 18-6801 (male rape) and 
I.C. § 18-911 (battery with intent to commit a serious felony). The elements of male 
rape, as charged in this case, are that the defendant (1) caused his penis to penetrate, 
however slightly, the oral opening of another male, (2) the penetration was for the 
purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse, and (3) the victim was prevented from 
resisting by threats of immediate and great bodily harm to himself, accompanied by the 
apparent power to inflict such harm. I.C. § 18-6801 (5); see also I.C.J.1. 902. The 
elements for battery with intent to commit a serious felony, as charged in this case, are 
that the defendant (1) committed a battery upon the victim (2) with the intent to commit 
rape or the infamous crime against nature. I.C. § 18-911; see also I.C.J.1. 1210. The 
elements of battery are that the defendant (1) willfully and unlawfully (2a) used force of 
violence upon the victim, or (2b) touched or struck the victim against his or her will, or 
(2c) caused bodily harm to the victim.4 I.C. § 18-903; see also I.C.J.1. 1204. 
Both statutes, though expressing it in different terms, require that the defendant 
commit a battery upon a person (willfully and unlawfully touch another person). See 
I.C. § 18-6801 (requiring of proof of specific touching by penetration of oral opening with 
the penis); I.C. § 18-911 (requiring proof of any touching). Both statutes also, though 
expressing it in different terms, require the same intent behind that touching. See 
4 There are three alternative means by which a person may commit a battery and each 
uses its own phrasing of the mens rea requirement (i.e., "willfully and unlawfully" as 
opposed to "actually, intentionally, and unlawfully"). See I.C. § 18-903; see also 
I.C.J.1. 1204. These variations, as well as the alternatives in regard to the actus reus, 
are not substantively different, leaving "a battery" summarized as "the willful and 
unlawful touching of another person." See id. 
12 
I.C. § 18-6801 (requiring proof of the intent to sexually arouse, gratify, or abuse); 
I.C. § 18-911 (requiring proof of the intent to touch with the intent to sexually arouse, 
gratify, or abuse (i.e., rape». Therefore, there is no bilateral uniqueness between the 
two statutes under which Mr. Moad was charged.5 At most, there is unilateral 
uniqueness, such as rape actually requires penetration, whereas battery with intent 
does not. Nonetheless, all the elements of battery with intent are otherwise included in 
the elements of rape. 
In fact, the Idaho courts have recognized that assault with intent to commit rape 
is a lesser included offense to rape. See, e.g., State v. Huggins, 105 Idaho 43, 
44 n.1 (1983) (adopting the Court of Appeals' analysis (see 103 Idaho 422, 425 
(Ct. App. 1982» regarding assault with intent to rape as a lesser included offense of 
rape, while overturning a different portion of the Court of Appeals' opinion); see also 
State v. Pickens, 148 Idaho 554, 559 (Ct. App. 2010) (vacating a conviction for assault 
with intent to commit rape since the parties stipulated that it was a lesser included 
offense of rape). As assault is a lesser included offense of battery, see, e.g., 
State v. Eisele, 107 Idaho 1035, 1036 (1985), the rationale in these cases is applicable 
to Mr. Moad's case. As such, the multiple prosecutions constitute a violation of his 
federal constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy. See Blockburger, 284 U.S. 
at 304; Huggins, 105 Idaho at 44 n.1. 
5 As will be explained in detail in Section II, infra, Mr. Moad contends there is insufficient 
evidence to support the charge of battery with intent to commit a serious felony, and 
that the charge should have been misdemeanor battery instead. Misdemeanor battery 
is also a lesser included offense of male rape, as both require a willful and unlawful 
touching (which is all battery is). In fact, the district court ultimately agreed to give the 
battery instruction as a lesser included offense to male rape: "Well, counsel ... you are 
getting a bad habit here. I'm finding myself, upon further reflection, agreeing with you 
far too often. So I think you are right about the lesser-included on Count 1, and so I 
have included battery as a lesser-included on Count 1." (Tr., Vo1.2, p.212, Ls.6-11.) 
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Even if this Court determines that these charges constitute separate offenses 
under the Blockburger test, it must still analyze the claim under the Idaho Constitution, 
which is assessed with the Thompson "pleadings" test. Corbus, 151 Idaho at 374 (citing 
State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 434 (1980»; see Flegel, 151 Idaho at 229. That 
test examines the charging documents, assessing whether, where there is one event of 
criminal conduct (which, as discussed in Section I(C)(1), supra, there is in this case), 
one charge is merely the means or element of the commission of the other. Thompson, 
101 Idaho at 434. The charging document in this case reveals that the State is not 
charging separate events of criminal conduct: 
COUNT I 
That the Defendant ... on or between the 3rd day of June, 2011 
and the 8th day of June 2011, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho did use 
his penis to penetrate the oral opening of [L T], a male person, which was 
done for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse, and where 
[L T] was prevented from resistance by threats of immediate and great 
bodily harm, accompanied by the apparent power of execution, to-wit: by 
physically beating and choking [L T]. 
COUNT II 
That the Defendant ... on or between the 3rd day of June, 2011 
and the 8th day of June, 2011, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did 
willfully and unlawfully use force or violence upon the person of [L T] by 
punching, elbowing, kneeing, and/or kicking [L T] multiple times, with the 
intent to commit rape and/or infamous crime against nature.6 
(R., pp.12-13.) It is clear from the face of the charging document that the two charges 
address the same issue and that Count II is merely an element of Count I or the 
means by which Count I was committed. The problem is specifically evidenced by the 
reference to "physically beating" as the reason for L.T. not resisting in Count I (element 
6 The evidence was clear that there was only one event covered by the two charges and 
the range of dates was only necessary as there was a discrepancy regarding on which 
of the two dates the single event occurred. (See Tr., Vo1.2, p.230, L.22 - p.231, L.14.) 
In fact, the jury was instructed that the precise dates were unimportant in regard to 
these charges. (Tr., Vo1.2, p.219, Ls.5-9; R., p.1 04.) 
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of the offense set forth in I.C. § 18-6801 (5)), and also alleging the physical beating as 
the actus reus in Count 1/. (See R., pp.12-13.) Therefore, they charge the same 
conduct in violation of the pleadings test. See Thompson, 101 Idaho at 434. 
Therefore, under either the United States or Idaho Constitutions, the dual 
prosecutions were inappropriate, and the subsequent punishments entered on those 
two counts violated Mr. Moad's state constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy. 
See, e.g., Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304; Thompson, 101 Idaho at 434; see also Corbus, 
151 Idaho at 374. 
3. The Fact That There Was No Jury Instruction Limiting Count 1/ To Only 
The Actions Following The Oral Rape Means That It Is Not Possible To 
Conclude That The Jury Convicted Mr. Moad On A Viable Theory 
Since, as discussed in the previous section, the acts preceding the oral rape 
cannot be the basis of an independent charge, convicting Mr. Moad for those actions as 
well as the oral rape is impermissible. As a result, both the prosecutor and defense 
counsel informed the jury that Count II should be limited to Mr. Moad's actions which 
immediately followed the oral rape. (See, e.g., Tr., Vo1.2, p.203, L.9 - p.205, L.10.) 
However, the district court did not instruct the jury in that regard. (See generally R., 
pp.97-122.) As a result, it is entirely possible that the jury did not unanimously convict 
Mr. Moad based only the conduct occurring after the oral rape.? 
? This is particularly likely in this case since the only battery with the intent to commit 
rape occurred before the rape. As will be discussed in detail in Section II, Mr. Moad 
was able to do everything he wanted before stopping the assault, which means the fact 
he did not rape L.T. again indicates he did not batter L.T. with the intent to commit rape. 
Therefore, the jury's verdict on the greater offense in regard to Count 2, when viewed 
alongside the conviction only on the lesser offense in regard to Count 3 (which was 
similar in this respect), actually indicates the verdict was not based solely on the actions 
occurring after the rape. Additionally, the specific actions alleged (punching, choking, 
etc.) corresponds better with the accounts of the pre-rape battery. 
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When such a situation exists and the jury instructions leave open the possibility 
for the jury to convict on an erroneous theory, the conviction must be vacated. 
State v. Luke, 134 Idaho 294, 301 (2000). In Luke, the jury instructions allowed for the 
possibility that the jury could have convicted the defendant of murder without finding the 
necessary specific intent. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court held: "In cases where it is not 
possible to determine if the jury reached the verdict on the correct or incorrect legal 
theory, this Court must vacate the conviction and remand for a new trial." Id.; see also 
State v. Buckley, 131 Idaho 164, 166-67 (1998); State v. McNair, 141 Idaho 263, 270 
(Ct. App. 2005). 
In regard to Count II, the jury was only instructed: 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Battery With Intent to 
Commit Rape or [the] Infamous Crime Against Nature, as charged in 
Count II, the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or between June 3,2011 [,] and June 18, 2011; 
2. in the state of Idaho; 
3. the defendant committed a battery upon [LT.]; 
4. by punching, elbowing, kneeing and/or kicking [L.T.] multiple 
times, and 
5. the defendant did so with the intent to commit rape and/or [the] 
infamous crime against nature. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant guilty. 
(R., p.110.) There was no indication that this instruction was limited to only the events 
following the oral rape. (See generally R., pp. 97-122.) In fact, element 4 indicates that 
it was, in fact, referring to the acts preceding the oral rape, since, according to L.T., the 
conduct after the oral rape "was finally him getting me to go over to my bunk and him 
pulling down my pants down to where -- rubbing his privates up against my buttocks as I 
was lying on my stomach on the bunk." (Tr., Vo1.2, p.158, Ls.4-8.) Officer Ibarra's 
testimony of his interview with Mr. Moad is similar in that respect: 
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And after [the oral rape] was done, he subsequently smacked [L.T.] 
around a little bit more. Somewhere on the way, they ended up where 
[L.T.] was face down on the bottom bunk. And the bunks are located one 
on top of another. They are metal bunks affixed to the wall. So [L.T.] was 
face down on the bottom bunk, and [Mr.] Moad had pulled down his pants 
and rubbed his penis in the buttock area of his cellmate. 
(Tr., Vo1.2, p.124, Ls.9-18.) The punching, elbowing, kneeing, and/or kicking, occurred 
before the oral rape. (See State's Exhibit 2; Tr., Vol.2, p.156, Ls.7-18.) Therefore, it is 
possible that the jury could have relied on the pre-rape actions to convict Mr. Moad of 
Count II. The district court even noted that there could be confusion in this regard, but 
decided not to instruct the jury on that point. (Tr., Vo1.2, p.205, LS.6-10 ("I agree with 
you, there can be just confusion based on the testimony as to which incident you are 
talking about [on Count III But it seems to me that would be appropriately addressed in 
argument.").) Since such a conviction would be improper, the conviction cannot stand. 
See, e.g., Luke 134 Idaho at 301; Buckley, 131 Idaho at 166-67; McNair, 141 Idaho at 
270. 
The district court's belief that counsel addressing this limitation in their closing 
arguments would cure that error is wrong. (Tr., Vo1.2, p.205, Ls.6-10.) The jury 
instructions must present a fair and accurate reflection of law. Luke, 134 Idaho at 300. 
Furthermore, the jury was also instructed that that the attorneys' closing arguments are 
only intended "to help you interpret the evidence, but [are] not evidence. If the facts as 
you remember them differ from the way the lawyers have stated them, follow your 
memory." (R., p.1 01; Tr., Vo1.2, p.216, Ls.19-24.) As such, the jury may have followed 
the instructions as written, as opposed to the lawyers' assertions intended only to help 
with deliberations, regarding Count" and reached an improper verdict on Count II. 
Additionally, the question is not whether the jury did convict on the erroneous theory, 
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only whether there is a possibility that it did SO.8 See, e.g., Luke, 134 Idaho at 301; 
Buckley, 131 Idaho at 166-67; State v. Thompson, 124 Idaho 881, 887-88 (1993). 
Therefore, since there is a distinct possibility that the conviction on Count" may have 
been based on the conduct preceding the oral rape, and since that sort of conviction 
would not be proper, this Court should vacate the conviction on Count II. Id. 
II. 
There Was Insufficient Evidence To Support The Guilty Verdict Against Mr. Moad For 
Battery With Intent To Commit Rape Or The Infamous Crime Against Nature 
A. Introduction 
The evidence, even taken in the light most favorable to the verdict, does not 
demonstrate that Mr. Moad committed the alleged battery with the intent to commit rape 
or the infamous crime against nature. Most notably, L. T. testified that he was unable to 
compete physically with Mr. Moad. Essentially, L.T. testified that Mr. Moad would win in 
such confrontations. As such, his testimony reveals that Mr. Moad was able to do 
everything he intended to do, and the fact that he raped L.T., battered him again, 
and did not follow that subsequent battery with a new attempt to rape or sodomize 
L.T. demonstrates that subsequent battery was not committed with the intent to rape 
or sodomize L T. As such, without sufficient evidence on that essential element of the 
offense, the verdict for battery with intent to commit rape or the infamous crime against 
nature should be vacated. 
8 Courts generally have restrained themselves from looking into the jury's thought 
process during deliberations. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1984). 
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B. Without Sufficient Evidence Of Mr. Moad's Intent, The Guilty Verdict For Battery 
With Intent To Commit Rape Or The Infamous Crime Against Nature Should Be 
Vacated 
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, appellate courts "independently 
consider the evidence to determine whether a reasonable mind could conclude that the 
defendant's guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt on each essential 
element of the crime." State v. Glass, 139 Idaho 815, 818 (Ct. App. 2003). During such 
a review, the evidence is construed in favor of the verdict and the appellate court will not 
reweigh the evidence or substitute its views regarding credibility of the witnesses. Id. 
Intent of the accused is a question of fact, a determination of which may be based on 
the circumstances surrounding the commission of the act. I. C . § 1 8-11 5; 
State v. Monroe, 128 Idaho 676,680 (Ct. App. 1996). 
In this case, L.T. testified that whenever his disagreements with Mr. Moad got 
physical, Mr. Moad would always come out on top. (Tr., Vo1.2, p.1S5, Ls.7-13.) He also 
testified that, usually, those physical encounters would end when Mr. Moad decided to 
stop the encounter. (Tr., Vo1.2, p.155, Ls.14-16.) Consistent with the prior encounters, 
L.T. testified that the battery in question (the buttocks incident) ended because "He 
[Mr. Moad] just finally quit. . .. he just sat down on one of the benches that was on --
by that table there" and began to clean himself off. (Tr., Vo1.2, p.160, Ls.6-21.) Given 
that evidence, it is apparent that, when Mr. Moad decided to get physical with L.T., 
Mr. Moad would do whatever it was he intended to do, and then would stop. Therefore, 
the evidence does not support the allegation that Mr. Moad committed the buttocks 
incident with the intent to rape or sodomize L.T. because, according to L T's testimony, 
had Mr. Moad intended such action, he would have been able to complete it. The fact, 
even according to L.T., that Mr. Moad did not even attempt to rape or sodomize L.T. 
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following that battery reveals that Mr. Moad harbored no intent to do so. At most, the 
evidence presented by the State shows that, like in Count III, Mr. Moad committed a 
misdemeanor battery. (See Tr., Vo1.2, p.249, L.19 - p.250, L.11.) 
Therefore, because the evidence presented, even taken in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, does not demonstrate that Mr. Moad had the intent to do 
anything after the buttocks incident, much less had the intent to commit the serious 
felony of rape or sodomy. As such, that conviction should be vacated. Glass, 139 
Idaho at 818. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Moad respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions for male 
rape and battery with the intent to commit rape or the infamous crime against nature 
because of the duplicitous punishments which violate his constitutional rights to be free 
from double jeopardy. Alternatively, he respectfully requests this Court vacate the latter 
charge for lack of sufficient evidence. In either case, he respectfully requests this Court 
remand his case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 1ih day of May, 2013. 
~//~~---
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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